This study investigates whether the governance attributes of Brazilian companies are associated with voluntary executive stock option (ESO) disclosure. Results show that Brazilian companies voluntarily disclose very little about their ESO plans, and that board size, presence of a compensation committee, and auditing by a Big 4 firm are significantly related to the degree of voluntary ESO disclosure. We also show that family controlled companies in Brazil are associated with low voluntary ESO disclosure. Results are robust to a number of specification tests, dependent and explanatory variable measurement, and sample composition. This study has professional and regulatory implications for Brazil and other emerging capital markets. Overall, the results underscore the need for stricter rules for reporting executive compensation plans in Brazil and the importance of strengthening the disclosure process through convergence with International Accounting Standards.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most widely accepted principles of corporate governance is that executive compensation should be tied to company performance. This principle has influenced practice, as evidenced by the tremendous growth in the use of executive stock option (henceforth ESO) plans as incentive compensation in the last two decades ( Greater transparency in executive compensation practices better enables shareholders to monitor the relationship between compensation and company performance and to verify whether senior management is in fact accountable to the board of directors (Conyon and Murphy 2000; Craighead, Magnan and Thorne 2004; Laksmana 2008) . Public disclosure can be particularly informative on complex compensation arrangements such as stock options, where the potential for wealth transfer to senior management is great (Conyon and Sadler 2001; Nelson et al. 2010) . Moreover, when compensation appears excessive (Core, Houlthasen and Larker 1999) or when it shrinks a company's competitive advantage (Laksmana 2008) , senior management are more inclined to provide opaque disclosures or to withhold sensitive information about their compensation arrangements. Hence, from a governance perspective, ESO disclosure is a topic of both academic and professional relevance. Consistent with the above motivations, this study investigates whether voluntary disclosure of ESO plans is associated with the company's governance structure in a comprehensive sample of Brazilian companies listed on the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa). We take the perspective that ESO plans are an efficient incentive mechanism to align management and shareholder interests, and consequently to stimulate value creation (Byrd, Parrino and Pritsh 1998) . However, depending on how they are designed and awarded, ESO plans can become vehicles to divert wealth from shareholders toward management in the absence of corresponding company performance (Andjelkovic, Boyle and McNoe 2002) .
Hence, the board of directors has a fiduciary responsibility to publically disclose the methods it uses to determine executive compensation (Laksmana 2008) .
As an emerging market that abounds in information asymmetry, ownership concentration, ineffective market surveillance, and poor investor protection (Lameira and Ness 2007; Black, De Carvalho and Gorga 2009) , Brazil offers a unique setting to investigate this issue. Historically, the private benefits of control in Brazilian companies have been high and the minimum legal rules and company-level governance weak (Dyck and Zingales 2004 ).
In addition, because developing countries present higher variation in their use of corporate governance mechanisms than most mature markets (Judge 2009) In fact, our results indicate that Brazilian listed companies that use ESO plans as a long-term incentive compensation mechanism disclose relatively little about these plans. We also show that board size, presence of a compensation committee, and using a Big 4 auditing firm are positive and statistically significant in explaining the variation in the degree of voluntary ESO disclosure. We also demonstrate that the presence of family controlled firms in
Brazil is associated with low voluntary ESO disclosure. Other findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of some governance corporate governance mechanisms to promote voluntary disclosure in Brazil. It is worth noting that these results were submitted to a variety of specification tests, on both dependent and independent variables, to ensure robust findings as far as possible.
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. determinants. Finally, to our knowledge, this is the first study of its kind to examine the Brazilian capital market, and one of only a few empirical studies on voluntary compensation disclosure in an emerging market. As such, our study has academic, professional, and regulatory implications for Brazil and other emerging capital markets.
The remainder of the document is structured as follows. We first provide some background on ESO disclosure practices in Brazil. This is followed by the theoretical framework used and the development of our research hypotheses. We then describe the data sources, data collection procedures, disclosure index construction, independent variables, and the model used in our empirical investigation. The results and the main implications are discussed, and a summary and conclusions are presented.
ESO DISCLOSURE IN BRAZIL
In Brazil, attempts to impose stricter rules for the public disclosure of executive compensation are recent and have been openly opposed by companies. 3 Currently, the mandatory rules require Brazilian listed companies to disclose only the aggregate amount paid to board members and top management, with no details about fixed, short-term, or long-term performance-contingent compensation. Moreover, the data on total compensation are unstructured, and what little information is disclosed is dispersed throughout the various voluntary and mandatory reports (Nunes 2008; Victor, Carvalho, Funchal, Terra 2010 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
Long-term incentive compensation is considered an essential governance mechanism.
It encourages managers to make decisions that meet shareholder expectations, and at the lowest possible cost (Murphy 1996; Byrd et al. 1998) . This belief has led to the international proliferation of ESO plans (Brenner and Schwalbach 2009). 4 Nevertheless, the apparently excessive compensation awards and their ostensibly weak relationships to company performance (Andjelkovic et al. 2002; Weisbach 2006) have raised the question of whether ESO plans can really maximize shareholder value and whether ESO disclosure 5 really enhances the effectiveness of incentive contracting with the chief executive officer (henceforth CEO). Advocates of mandatory disclosure of compensation practices argue that transparency reduces the costs of both shareholder monitoring and agency compensation (Bahar 2006) . Disclosure is also widely recognized as the backbone of effective regulation of 4 The ESO plan is a contract that gives management individuals the right, but not the obligation, to underwrite a company's shares at a fixed price within a fixed period of time. Conceptually, the main objective is to align executive and shareholder interests such that executives are concerned with the expected cash flow during their time with the company (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996) . The ESO plan is also a way to retain talent (Silva et al. 2007) . 5 Executive compensation disclosure has been mandatory in the United States since 1934. However, only in recent years have a few other countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and France required the disclosure of executive compensation data.
incentive compensation, as well as good governance practice (Hill 1997; Conyon and Sadler 2001) . For instance, Swan and Zhou (2006) and Andjelkovic et al. (2002) show that greater transparency in executive compensation reduces information asymmetry, which they attribute to improved monitoring of executive compensation and its relationship to company performance.
Consistent with the literature, we focus on ESO plan disclosure for three main reasons.
First, as mentioned above, detailed data on the other components of top management compensation in Brazilian listed companies are not publicly available. Second, the design and disclosure of ESO plans are part of the overall fiduciary responsibilities of the board of directors. The board is mandated to set performance goals and establish the amount of incentive compensation for each senior executive, while the compensation committee has the responsibility to assess executive performance, decide on whether the incentive compensation should be awarded, and adjust the amount of compensation as necessary (Conyon and Peck 1998; Epstein and Roy 2005; Silva and Tosi 2004) . Given these fiduciary responsibilities, ESO disclosure is intended to provide shareholders with the information they need to assess how well directors represent their interests and how accountable executives are to the board of directors. With greater ESO disclosure, directors also signal to the market how they are fulfilling their responsibilities, ensure their reputation, and make their value-adding actions transparent to other stakeholders. Third, given that ESO plans can result in potentially large wealth transfers to managers, executives would be inclined to provide opaque disclosures or to withhold sensitive compensation information. Greater disclosure of compensation practices increases investors' ability to monitor and sanction managers for underperformance. It could also lessen management's ability to negotiate advantageous contract terms in future Sadler 2001, Laksmana 2008; Nelson et al. 2010) .
Although ESO plan disclosure is a controversial issue, the literature contains only a few studies in this area, and the findings are inconclusive. For instance, Conyon et al. (2002) found an association between ESO disclosure and certain board characteristics in U.K. listed companies, but they did not examine other governance attributes or the extent of ESO disclosure compliance. Nelson and Percy (2005) and Nelson et al. (2010) examined the association between ESO disclosure and several governance mechanisms in a sample of Australian listed companies. However, they specifically looked at the disclosure of ESOsensitive information and compliance with statutory disclosure rules in a mature market.
Hence, an investigation of voluntary ESO disclosure in Brazilian listed companies could provide new insight into how boards of directors perform their fiduciary reporting duties in a climate of weak regulatory enforcement and corporate governance. In the next paragraphs we present our research hypotheses on the association between governance attributes and voluntary ESO disclosure in Brazilian companies. We group our hypotheses into three broad categories: board structure and composition, audit quality, and ownership structure.
Board structure and composition
The research on governance views the board of directors as the keystone of a company's corporate governance quality (Fama and Jensen 1983) . One of the most frequently examined characteristics to assess governance effectiveness is board size. The general rule is that the board should be small enough to deliberate expeditiously, yet large enough to fully employ all its expertise and embrace all its responsibilities (Andjelkovic et al. 2002) . Yermack (1996) suggests that small boards are more likely to provide CEOs with stronger compensation incentives and to dismiss CEOs for poor performance. However, more recent studies suggest that larger boards have a greater knowledge base from which to fulfill their advisory role (Coles, Daniel and Naveen 2005) . Similarly, Laksmana (2008) contend that board size is positively related to executive compensation disclosure in the U.S., arguably because larger boards have more resources available to perform their functions and would more closely monitor compensation policies and disclosure.
In Brazil, two major weaknesses in governance quality are board structure and board composition. According to Black et al. (2010: 22) The governance literature also concurs that effective monitoring by the board necessitates a majority of outside independent directors who are not affiliated with management (Fama and Jensen 1983) . Independent directors are assumed to make more objective decisions and to better monitor shareholder interests than inside directors, whose careers tend to be tied to the CEO's (Core et al. 1999; Epstein and Roy 2005) . The research supports this argument, showing that boards dominated by inside directors increase the likelihood of earnings manipulation and fraudulent financial statements (Dechow et al. 1996) and decrease the likelihood of auditors' issuing going-concern opinions (Carcello and Neal 2000). Moreover, Chen and Jaggi (2000) and Huafang and Jianguo (2007) found a positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors and overall voluntary disclosure. Laksmana (2008) reported a similar association specifically for the disclosure of executive compensation practices by U.S. companies. In addition, Nelson et al. (2010) found a positive association between factors related to board independence and compliance with ESO statutory disclosure laws in Australian companies. These findings suggest that independent directors have more incentive to improve the company's compensation disclosure practices in order to
maintain their reputation and demonstrate high quality board governance.
Unlike in the U.S., the U.K., and Australia, where most of the studies on ESO disclosure have been conducted, Brazil has no legal requirements for board independence.
One-third of board members are usually company officers, and some or all of the nonexecutive directors represent the controlling shareholder (Black et al. 2010: 26) . Moreover, in less regulated markets the demand for independent boards tends to be driven by the company's disclosure level (Vassallo and Wells 2006; Machuga and Teitel 2009 Another board attribute that is said to promote board independence from management is separation between the CEO and board chair functions. The combination of these two functions, called CEO duality, is assumed to increase CEO power and consequently hinder the three most important functions of the board: monitoring, disciplining, and reporting to shareholders (Fama and Jensen 1983) . The empirical research generally supports these claims,
showing that CEO duality is negatively associated with the quality of financial disclosure (Forker 1992; Huafang and Jianguo 2007) and the disclosure of compensation practices (Conyon et al. 2002; Laksmana 2008) . Accordingly, we contend that Brazilian companies in which the CEO chairs the board are likely to be less responsive to investors' demands for greater compensation disclosure. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H3: CEO duality is negatively associated with voluntary ESO disclosure.
Audit Quality
The governance literature views independent auditors as gatekeepers who monitor managerial behavior on behalf of the company's stakeholders. Corporate governance (2006) and Nelson et al. (2010) also found that audit quality contributes to improved compliance to compensation disclosure rules.
Brazilian listed companies must have their financial statements audited by an independent auditor. They must also rotate the external auditor every five years, and they cannot rehire a former auditor for at least three years. 7 Moreover, according to the Memorandum, independent auditors are responsible for monitoring corporate disclosure practices. We therefore expect Brazilian listed companies with a Big 4 external auditor to be more responsive to investors' demands for greater compensation disclosure. This leads to the following hypothesis:
H4: Auditing by a Big 4 auditor is positively associated with voluntary ESO disclosure.

Ownership Structure
The research on the effects of ownership structure on internal governance mechanisms suggests that investors who monitor managers absorb all the monitoring costs but receive benefits that are only proportional to their shareholdings (e.g., Fama and Jensen 1983; Byrd et al. 1998 ). This discourages minority shareholders from closely monitoring management decision making, leaving the task to another, larger shareholder. The presence of large shareholders in the ownership structure is therefore expected to increase monitoring efforts, reduce agency costs, and increase company value (Byrd et al. 1998 ). However, controlling
shareholders have strong incentives to use inadequate disclosure practices, as certain information could reveal the individual benefits awarded to management and/or controlling shareholders to outsiders, who in turn might take disciplinary action against them (Zingales 1995; Tinaikar 2009; Nelson et al. 2010) . Limited disclosure of compensation practices is also assumed to be a relatively inexpensive and attractive way for insiders to conceal excess compensation, compared to directly manipulating compensation contracts (Tinaikar 2009 ). In other words, improving compensation disclosure increases the cost to management and controlling shareholders of expropriating the company's assets through excess compensation.
The empirical evidence supports these claims. For example, Machuga and Tetel (2009) 
H5: Ownership concentration (measured by the disparity between voting and cash flow rights) is negatively associated with voluntary ESO disclosure.
RESEARCH METHODS
Sample and data
Empirical testing is performed on data from companies listed on the São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa). To be included in the sample, companies must have had active ESO plans in the calendar year 2007. Data on ESO plans were retrieved from the companies' annual reports, websites, and official CVM filings.
To avoid neglecting companies that had not disclosed ESO plan data, even though they had active ESO plans, we also sent a direct e-mail survey to all Bovespa listed companies. We asked companies (a) whether they had an active ESO plan, including the inception date, and (b) whether the board of directors included a compensation committee. Consumption Goods, Non-Cyclical Consumption Goods, and Transportation and Construction (11 companies each, about 16% of the total) and the fewest operating in the Public Utilities sector (6%).
For a broader interpretation of the results, we examine our sample representativeness in terms of the average Brazilian listed company. Table 2 presents a comparative analysis between the characteristics of our sampled companies and all Bovespa companies. We focus on six aspects: size, market capitalization, stock market liquidity, profitability, listing in Bovespa's premium segments (Level 2 and Novo Mercado), and issuance of American Depositary Receipt (ADR) levels II and III. Limiting the analysis to companies that were active in Bovespa in 2007, 10 the companies in our sample are statistically indistinguishable from the average Bovespa listed company, at the usual significant levels. Comparing our sample companies to companies included in the Bovespa market index (IBovespa), we again find no significant differences. Therefore, we can reasonably assume that our sample is representative of the Brazilian stock market. Table 2 about here
Voluntary ESO disclosure index
As discussed above, the Brazilian regulation for ESO disclosure is not yet official and is primarily voluntary. However, since 2004 there has been a trend towards harmonization with international disclosure standards, resulting in the release by the CVM of several official recommendations for the disclosure of detailed information about the components of executive performance-contingent compensation (CVM, 2004) . Specifically, the abovementioned Memorandum of February 14, 2007 (CVM, 2007 provided the basis for the criteria we use to build our voluntary ESO disclosure index. The Memorandum makes recommendations for the disclosure of different executive compensation items, including stock-based compensation, which should be included in the footnotes of audited financial statements. It is worth noting that because this regulation merely suggests the nature of the disclosed information, ESO disclosure was completely voluntary during the period of this investigation. Table 3 summarizes the content of the seven items in the Memorandum, including the total number of sub-items.
Insert Table 3 about here ---------------------------------Most indices measuring the disclosure level of executive compensation practices are based on mandatory disclosure regulation (Coulton, James and Taylor, 2001; Clarkson, Van Beuren and Walker, 2006; Tinaikar 2006) . These indices take into account the relationship between the quantity and quality of the disclosed information. Given the voluntary aspect of ESO disclosure in Brazil, we do not rate the quality of the disclosed information. This would have introduced considerable subjectivity into our index.
11 Accordingly, we construct our index by attributing a value of 1 to each ESO disclosure item recommended by the Memorandum.
Using the criteria presented in Table 3 and the content analysis method (Bardin, 1977) , the information retrieved from the companies' annual reports, explanatory notes to audited financial statements, and websites are coded. The obtained scores are then combined to obtain an overall ESO disclosure index for each company. Given that some aspects of the Memorandum might be considered more important to disclose than others, different II. Identical to (I) above, but based on information disclosed on the company's website.
III. The sum of I and II above normalized by twice the number of sub-items (46) to produce an index from 0 and 1.
IV. An index that is equally weighted across the five items in the Memorandum, with items scored according to the number of sub-items concerning financial reports and websites.
11 It is important to note that some ESO disclosure items are not scored in our index. Specifically, item IV would apply only to companies whose plans would already allow their exercise during 2007. Because the majority of ESO plans in Brazil were approved between 2005 and 2007, the option exercise rights had not yet been acquired by December 31, 2007. The same holds for Item VI, as its occurrence is also linked to the exercise of options.
For instance, because item V in the Memorandum includes two sub-items, each subitem accounts for one-half of the item (1/10 of the total index), whereas for item II (11 sub-items), each sub-item accounts for only one-eleventh of this item (1/55 of the total index). This weighting scheme aims to balance the importance of items that include fewer sub-items (III, V, and VII). This index is also normalized between 0 and 1.
V. An index weighted according to expert opinions obtained via the Delphi method (see Appendix A for details). Weights are then applied to the sum of counts obtained from financial reports and websites.
VI. Identical to (V) above, but the expert opinions are then equally weighted by the number of sub-items in each item, as in (IV) above. Weights are also applied to the sum of the counts from financial reports and websites.
More details on index construction and validity are given in Appendix A. Descriptive statistics of these indices are presented in Table 4 . Most indices are normally distributed (according to the Jarque-Bera test), except for indices IV and VI. This indicates that assigning equal weights to each item in the Memorandum skews the index distribution to the right.
More importantly, the indices are highly correlated. Pearson's correlation coefficients range from 0.776 to 0.999, and without exception, they are significant at the 1% level or less. This indicates that our results should be robust to different index sub-item weighting. We further support the robustness of our measures at the end of the results section. Table 4 about here
Empirical model
In order to test our research hypotheses, the dependent variable of this study (the voluntary ESO disclosure index) is regressed on the explanatory variables representing the companies' corporate governance framework (described in our research hypotheses) and selected control variables, using the following model: where DISCL i is a continuous dependent variable reflecting the degree of ESO disclosure, X i are the corporate governance variables, Z i are other company-level control variables, 0 and i are the coefficients to be estimated, and u i is a random error term.
Explanatory and Control Variables
Data on companies' governance attributes were obtained from their annual reports, websites, and official CVM filings. Board structure is measured using the following variables:
board size, proportion of independent directors, 12 CEO/board chair duality, and the presence of a compensation committee. Audit quality is measured by a dummy variable indicating whether the company's independent auditor was a Big 4 firm. Ownership structure is measured by the imbalance between ownership and control, more precisely, the percentage of voting power held by controlling shareholders in relation to their percentage of cash flow rights. This variable "indicates the propensity of controllers to extract private benefits from the control of the company" (Lima and Terra 2005:8) . A dummy variable for familycontrolled companies is also included, because the presence of family members in executive positions and/or on the board may influence the company's tendency to disclose.
Consistent with the literature on compensation disclosure (e.g., Conyon and Sadler 2001; Tinaikar 2009; Nelson et al. 2010) , the company-level control variables included in the regressions are company size, financial leverage, profitability, listing on Bovespa's premium 12 The rules for board disclosure in Brazil require companies to identify "executive or non-executive directors"
only. Consequently, the independent and unrelated attributes are not automatically contained in the disclosed information. We hand-collected data on boards of directors to identify whether non-executive directors (1) were appointed by or (2) had family ties with the controlling shareholder. Our variable board independence is measured by the number of non-executive directors without ties or appointed by the controlling shareholder divided by the total number of directors on the board.
segments, and industry sector. Accounting and stock market data for the computation of these variables were obtained mostly from the Economática © database, but are also complemented and/or validated with data manually collected from official CVM and Bovespa fillings.
Detailed descriptions of explanatory and control variables are provided in Table 5 . Table 5 about here
Summary statistics for the independent and control variables are presented in Table 6 .
The boards of companies that use stock option plans to compensate their executives contain an average of seven to eight members. These companies have a minimum of four members on the board and a maximum of 15. The proportion of independent members is 32% on average, with a minimum of 0% and a maximum of 100%. The percentage of companies in which the same individual serves as the CEO and board chair is low, at only 19%, and only 37% of the companies have a formal compensation committee on the board. Regarding audit quality, the vast majority of companies (86%) are audited by a Big 4 auditing firm.
With respect to ownership structure, the average vote-to-capital ratio is 1.28. This means that, on average, the percentage of voting shares held by majority shareholders is greater than their share in the company's total equity. As expected, this confirms that voting power is concentrated in Brazilian publicly traded companies. Family-controlled companies account for 34% of the companies in our study, a relatively high proportion considering that these are listed companies, albeit consistent with the Brazilian context (Brenner and Schwalbach 2009, Black et al. 2009 ). Table 6 about here Table 6 also presents the descriptive statistics for the control variables representing the general characteristics of the companies in our study. Average company size, represented by total assets, is about R$10.5 billion (about US$6 billion). The average financial leverage shows that debt capital financing accounts for around 52% of the total assets. Average profitability, based on return on assets (ROA), is 4.5%. Finally, as expected, a substantial percentage (66%) of companies is listed in Bovespa's top premium segments, i.e., Level 2 and Novo Mercado.
13
The correlation matrix presented in Table 7 shows that the independent variables are weakly correlated. The highest correlation is only 0.47 (between company size and board size) and the lowest is -0.36 (between Bovespa premium segment and compensation committee). Most correlations are insignificant at the usual significance levels, and none is significant at the 1% level.
--------------------------------------------
Insert Table 7 
about here --------------------------------------------
RESULTS
Executive stock option (ESO) disclosure practices in Brazilian companies
Due to the lack of statutory obligation to meet the aforementioned CVM disclosure recommendations, ESO disclosure practices differ widely across the sampled companies.
Besides differences in the amount of information made available, a lack of standardization can be seen. The greatest variation is in the number of companies that disclosed information by sub-item. For example, only three of the 68 companies disclosed whether or not they imposed stock option transfer conditions, whereas 47 reported the amount of authorized and exercised options for the period.
On average, the companies provided information in their audited financial statements on about nine of the 23 sub-items. On the websites, the average number of disclosed subitems is 10.51. In other words, the companies reported on average 10 of the 23 sub-items, either in financial statements or on websites. This can be explained by the fact that many of the websites contained not only standard financial statements, but also links to additional information on corporate governance practices, including information on stock option plans.
Regarding Item I, the most frequently reported information concerns the eligible beneficiaries, reported by 74% of companies; grace period conditions, reported by 66%; and the maximum number of shares to be awarded, reported by 63%. The conditions for transferring granted stock options, accounting treatment, and the alienation of options were reported by only 15%, 26%, and 37% of companies respectively, while maturity conditions were reported by exactly half.
For Item II, the most reported information concerns the option exercise price and the number of options granted and exercised in the period, disclosed by 75%, 74%, and 74% of companies. The least reported information concerns the kinds of rights granted by the underlying shares (voting rights, special divided rights, mandatory bid rule rights, liquidation rights, etc.) (only 29% of companies) and the options cancelled in the period (37% of companies).
Items III, V, and VII represent the information least reported by the companies. Importantly, only 25% reported the dilution of ownership to which current shareholders would be submitted in case the granted stock options were exercised by the beneficiaries. Only 21% reported the dates or periods when the beneficiaries would acquire the right to exercise the options and when those rights would expire. A slightly higher percentage (32%) reported the effect on earnings of the expensing of compensation within the fiscal year, although a much smaller percentage (19%) reported the effects on liquid assets.
The descriptive statistics for the various weighted indices are presented in Table 4, showing that the average voluntary ESO disclosure index ranges from 0.32 to 0.46 (median 0.26 and 0.44). The fact that the median is below the mean and the considerable distance between the 3rd quartile and the maximum score highlight the low average disclosure among the companies Table 8 presents the results of the multiple linear regressions on the determinants of voluntary ESO disclosure estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). We estimate the regressions for each disclosure index in order to draw general conclusions that are robust to the measurement of the dependent variable.
Determinants of voluntary executive stock option (ESO) disclosure
Although it explains 30% on average of the variation in the degree of voluntary ESO disclosure, the adjusted R can be considered reasonable when compared to other studies on this issue, and given the focus of our study. Recall that our main objective is to highlight the role played by certain governance attributes in the decision to voluntarily disclose information about ESO plans. The adequacy of the standard linear regression model assumptions is verified by a number of specification tests (heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, nonlinearity, normality, and multicollinearity), and all regressions pass all tests, with the exception of disclosure Index IV for the Lagrange Multiplier heteroskedasticity test (homoskedasticity rejected at the 5% level). We may therefore conclude that our regressions are well specified. Table 8 presents the main findings of our study: board size, the presence of a compensation committee, and auditing by a Big 4 firm are consistently significant across the six disclosure indices. Moreover, the signs for these variables are consistent with our theoretical predictions, suggesting that voluntary ESO disclosure practices in Brazilian companies are positively associated with larger boards, a formal compensation committee, and a Big 4 auditor. These results support hypotheses H1 and H4.
The remaining explanatory variables fail to reach the usual significance levels.
Therefore, hypotheses H2, H3, and H5 are not supported, casting some doubt on the effectiveness of these corporate governance mechanisms to promote voluntary ESO disclosure in Brazil.
--------------------------------------------
Insert Table 8 
about here --------------------------------------------
Robustness checks
Given the small absolute number of Brazilian firms with active ESO plans, a potential concern in this study is that our results could be influenced by a few observations. We again stress that, based on our meticulous data collection procedures, we are confident that the companies included in this study are representative of all companies that had active ESO plans in Brazil in 2007. Nevertheless, the robustness of our findings would be in question if they were not robust to the composition of the companies sampled.
In order to address this issue, a Leamer's (1985) global sensitivity analysis is performed. Thus, each regression is run repeatedly, eliminating one company each time. If our findings were contingent on the composition of each sub-sample, then large variations in coefficients, t-statistics, and the significance of explanatory variables should be identified.
The sensitivity analysis results are presented in Table 9 . For brevity, we report only the results on disclosure index III (equally weighted by the number of sub-items based on both financial reports and websites). Results for the other five indices are similar and are available on request.
--------------------------------------------
Insert Table 9 
about here --------------------------------------------
The sensitivity analysis confirms the above-reported results: board size, the presence of a formal compensation committee, and auditing by a Big 4 firm show significant and positive coefficients in all regressions (Table 9 , Panel A). Moreover, these variables are significant at the 5% level respectively for 100%, 72%, and 96% of the regressions. This strongly supports the robustness of our findings. Similarly, non-significant variables are rarely significant, further supporting our results and the stability of our model.
A number of further robustness checks are run to verify the consistency of our results.
First, we more closely examine the effect of other ownership structure characteristics. Given the higher disclosure standards that certain shareholders usually demand, we consider the presence of large institutional and foreign shareholdings in the company as well as the issuance of ADR levels II and III. These variables are insignificant and their inclusion leaves the results basically unchanged with respect to our baseline model. Second, we include the board independence measure squared to investigate whether the effect of independence is nonlinear. This variable is also insignificant, and does not change the previous results. Finally, we estimate the model for a sub-sample of 55 companies that voluntarily disclosed other aspects of executive compensation. One might assume that these companies were more likely to disclose details of their ESO plans as well, and are therefore unrepresentative of regular companies. Again, the main results are unchanged. However, the dummy variable measuring family-controlled companies is negative and significant, supporting Hypothesis H5, which predicts that ownership concentration lessens voluntary ESO disclosure.
Based on the robustness results, we conclude that our baseline results are robust to measurement differences in both the dependent and independent variables. Together with the results presented in Table 8 , these results appear to reflect the underlying factors that determine voluntary ESO disclosure in Brazilian publicly traded companies. This study has some limitations. The sample size is small compared to similar studies.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
However, given the Brazilian context and the fact that we focus on voluntary disclosure, we are confident that our sample is representative of all companies in the Bovespa stock exchange with an active ESO plan in 2007. In our index to measure the degree of voluntary ESO disclosure, equal weighting is assigned to the different disclosure criteria. This assumes that each criterion is equally important within the index and across the companies. However, the robustness tests performed on the indices reveal that different weighting systems would not noticeably affect the results. Therefore, despite the limitations, our results make a relevant contribution to the literature, and more specifically, to the empirical governance research in less mature markets like Brazil.
The main implications of our results are that (1) because Brazilian companies that use ESO plans disclose little about their executive compensation arrangements, stricter and mandatory compensation disclosure rules by the surveillance authorities would be a substantial improvement from the viewpoint of investors; (2) because board size is significant to explain disclosure practices, corporate governance abiding companies should attempt to have larger boards; (3) because the presence of a compensation committee increases the amount of information disclosed, regulatory authorities should put forward stronger recommendations for the adoption of compensation and auditing board committees by listed companies; and (4) because the type of auditing firm also has a significant impact on ESO disclosure, both companies and authorities should take steps to ensure adequate auditor independence.
Future research can further explore this issue by investigating the disclosure of other components of executive compensation in Brazilian listed companies. The focus on the disclosure, voluntary or mandatory, of sensitive information for the valuation of ESO grants is also a potential avenue for future research. Once detailed compensation disclosure becomes mandatory in Brazil, the costs and benefits of disclosing such information could be explored.
In conclusion, this study underscores the need for stricter reporting rules for executive compensation disclosure in Brazil, as well as the importance of achieving greater convergence with the International Accounting Standards. We believe that the single most important regulatory initiative would be to make the disclosure of all components of the executive compensation plan mandatory. For instance, the Summary Compensation Table of the US-SEC's 10-K form, which breaks down the different types of compensation granted to individual executives, could be a starting point for the standardization of compensation disclosure in Brazil and other emerging markets. Number of Sub-items I -Presence of option plans, with a description of their nature and conditions (including eligibility conditions for beneficiaries); 7 II -Quantity, description of the nature, and conditions (including, as applicable, rights to dividends, votes, conversion, dates of exercise, and expiration) and amount of authorized, exercised, and expired options, as applicable, held by each group of beneficiaries, including their exercise price, or, as applicable, the calculation method. The measure of the beneficiaries' eligibility to exercise the rights should be indicated (for example, the time elapsed since the authorization date of the option with respect to the total length of time over which the beneficiary can exercise the option); 11 III -Percentage of ownership dilution to which the current shareholders will be submitted in case all authorized options are exercised; 1 IV -Regarding the exercised options, a description of the shares delivered, in terms of quantity, class, and type, and the total and unit price of the exercise for each class and type, and the retrospective market price on the respective dates; 1.000 Disclosure Indices: I -equally weighted by number of sub-items based on financial reports; II -equally weighted by number of sub-items based on the company's website; III -equally weighted by number of subitems based on both financial reports and websites; IV -equally weighted by number of items based on both financial reports and websites; V -sub-items weighted according to expert opinion based on both financial reports and websites; VI -weighted by number of items according to expert opinion based on both financial reports and websites. All correlations are significant at the 1% level or less. Maximum correlation: 0.999; minimum correlation: 0.776. E a r n i n g s b e f o r e i n t e r e s t a Dependent Variables (Disclosure Indices): I -equally-weighted by number of sub-items based on financial reports; II -equally-weighted by number of sub-items based on the company's website; III -equally-weighted by number of sub-items based both on financial reports and websites; IV -equally-weighted by number of items based both on financial reports and websites; V -sub-items weighted according to experts' opinion based both on financial reports and websites; VI -weighted by number of items according to experts' opinion based both on financial reports and websites. Explanatory Variables: Board Size = No. of members on the board of directors; Board Independence = No. of outside (non-executive) directors not appointed by the controlling shareholder ÷ No. of members on the board of directors; Duality CEO/Chairman of the Board = 1 if the CEO is also the board chair and 0 otherwise; Compensation committee = 1 if there is a compensation committee and 0 if not; Big-4 Auditing = 1 if the accounting reports are audited by one of the 4 largest auditing firms and 0 otherwise; Concentration of Voting Power = % votes of the largest stockholder ÷ % capital of the largest stockholder; Family Company = 1 if the company is controlled by a family and 0 otherwise; Company Size = value of total assets; Financial Leverage = debt-equity ratio; Profitability = return on assets; Bovespa premium segment = 1 if the company is listed in levels 1 or 2 and the Novo Mercado of Bovespa and 0 otherwise. VIF: Variance Inflation Factor. t-Statistics in round brackets. p-Values in square brackets. * significant at the 10% level (one-tailed), ** significant at the 5% level (one-tailed), *** significant at the 1% level (one-tailed).
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(continues) equally weighted by number of sub-items based on financial reports; II -equally weighted by number of sub-items based on company's website; III -equally weighted by number of sub-items based on both financial reports and websites; IV -equally weighted by number of items based on both financial reports and websites; V -sub-items weighted according to expert opinion based on both financial reports and websites; VI -weighted by number of items according to expert opinion based on both financial reports and websites. Explanatory Variables: Board Size = No. of members on the board of directors; Board Independence = No. of outside (non-executive) directors not appointed by the controlling shareholder ÷ No. of members on the board of directors; CEO/Board Chair duality = 1 if the CEO is also the board chair and 0 otherwise; Compensation committee = 1 if there is a compensation committee and 0 if not; Big 4 Auditing = 1 if the accounting reports are audited by one of the 4 largest auditing firms and 0 otherwise; Concentration of Voting Power = % votes of the largest stockholder ÷ % capital of the largest stockholder; Family Company = 1 if the company is controlled by a family and 0 otherwise; Company Size = value of total assets; Financial Leverage = debt-equity ratio; Profitability = return on assets; Bovespa's premium segment = 1 if the company is listed in Bovespa's level 1 or 2 and the Novo Mercado and 0 otherwise. VIF: Variance Inflation Factor. t-Statistics in round brackets. p-Values in square brackets. * significant at the 10% level (one-tailed), ** significant at the 5% level (one-tailed), *** significant at the 1% level (one-tailed). 
Index Construction
Our voluntary disclosure index is based on the 23 sub-items in Memorandum CVM/SNC/SEP No. 01/2007 of February 14, 2007 (CVM, 2007 . As a first step, a value of 1 is attributed to sub-items for which the company disclosed information and zero otherwise. The quality, usefulness, or thoroughness of the disclosed information is not rated, but its occurrence is reported. The final equally weighted index is the simple sum of a company's score divided by 23 in order to express the index as a range from 0 to 1. This simple index is computed from two basic information sources: the company's annual report and financial statements filed with CVM and/or the company's website. The former generates our equally weighted Index I and the latter our Index II. The two information sources are then aggregated to obtain Index III. Accordingly, this index is normalized by 46, i.e. twice the total number of sub-items. 15 Given the possibility that different sub-items are more important than others, we decided to experiment with different weighting schemes. First, equal weights are assigned to each item in the Memorandum instead of each piece of information disclosed. For instance, item I comprises seven different pieces of information, whereas item III comprises only one piece of information. Therefore, in our above-presented baseline models, item I is potentially seven times more important to measure ESO disclosure than item III. Assigning equal weights to each item is therefore a way to even out the importance of each disclosure class by assigning more weight in the final index to pieces of information under items with fewer subitems (i.e., items III, V, and VII in the Memorandum).
Finally, each sub-item is assigned a different weight according to expert opinion. Following the Delphi method proposed by Dalkey & Helmer (1963) , 16 four finance and accounting professors from the most respected universities in Brazil offer their opinions. Among these are two leading experts on Brazilian corporate governance, and at least three have published extensively in high-profile international journals such as Corporate Governance, Emerging Markets Review, and Financial Management. They were asked to rate the 23 sub-items in the Memorandum on a five-point Likert scale in terms of how they perceived them. Their scores were averaged by sub-item and the results were submitted to the experts for a second round. They could change (or not) their original rating based on the average ratings of the other experts. The second-round results are averaged by sub-item and normalized by the sum of the ratings to obtain the weights. The final disclosure, Index V, is obtained by multiplying each weight by the original score for each company in Index III (the sum of financial reports and websites). Disclosure Index VI applies the expert weights to the sub-items and normalizes them to obtain the same total weight for each item in the Memorandum, as in Index IV. The final weighting is then applied to the sum of the financial reports and website scores. 15 In this index, each sub-item is counted twice in case it is reported in both the company's financial reports and the company website. This approach is suitable for our study because it obtains higher scores for companies that have taken the trouble to release their information in different media. 16 More details on the Delphi method can be found in Linstone and Turoff (2002) .
Index Validity
A series of procedures are used to validate our index. First, as mentioned above, the correlations among the six indices are tested. The results in Table 4 reveal that they are highly positively correlated and that all correlations are significant at the 1% level.
Second, according to Laksmana's (2008) method, the validity of our measures is assessed by their correlation to stock volatility. According to Laksmana (2008) , bid-ask spreads and stock return volatility are well known proxies for information asymmetry. As greater disclosure should reduce investor uncertainty, valid disclosure indices should present negative correlations with information asymmetry proxies. Bid-ask spread data for Brazil is unavailable, but we do have data on stock return volatility.
17 Hence, our six indices were submitted to the Laksmana (2008) test. Table A1 , Panel A presents the results. All six indices are negatively correlated with stock return volatility. Moreover, our estimates are close to those of Laksmana (2008) . 18 Correlations between logarithmic transformations of the variables are also computed, as Laksmana (2008) suggests that the relationship between these variables may be nonlinear. Again, our indices correlate negatively with the proxy for information asymmetry, and our estimates are close to those of Laksmana (2008) . Finally, to test whether our expert opinions using the Delphi method are robust to the composition of the expert panel, the same evaluation form was submitted to five Ph.D. candidates in finance and accounting at Brazil's top universities. Results are presented in Table A1 , Panel B. The expert and Ph.D. candidate assessments are very similar. Results of an F-test of equality of variances cannot reject the null hypothesis that both scores are drawn from the same distribution. Moreover, the scores display strong positive correlation, significant at the 1% level. We therefore conclude that the experts' weights are consistent. Based on these procedures, we conclude that our ESO disclosure measures are valid.
